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Abstract
This paper studies the credibility of a low inflation policy in a 
two country Barro-Gordon framework. When the nominal ex­
change rate floats and inflation is targeted, the realized inflation 
rate is in part uncontrollable due to stochastic disturbances. In 
contrast, a pegged nominal exchange rate can in principle be per­
fectly controlled. Given the foreign authority is precommited to 
low inflation, exchange rate pegging is therefore also more trans­
parent. It is shown that if real shocks to productivity are simi­
lar in both countries, then the higher transparency of exchange 
rate pegging can lead to lower domestic equilibrium inflation than 
when inflation itself is targeted. This is interpreted as an import 
of credibility.
KEYWORDS: Controllability; Credibility; Exchange Rate Pegging; 
Incomplete Information.
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The European Monetary System (EMS) is probably the most frequently 
studied example of inflation convergence in a regime of pegged exchange 
rates.1 When the system was founded in 1979, Germany was the EMS 
member with the lowest average inflation rate, which is usually attributed 
to the successive appointments of conservative and independent central 
bankers. As Rogoff (1985) showed, a conservative and independent cen­
tral banker can credibly precommit to a low inflation policy and therefore 
avoid the inflationary bias arising from the time consistency problem of 
monetary policy. In contrast to the German Bundesbank, most other 
European central banks do not have access to such a precommitment 
technology because of their dependence upon the governments, which 
perceive surprise inflation as being beneficial. However, some of these 
countries have been able to disinflate successfully after entering the EMS. 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) explained this by suggesting that pegging 
to the German Mark can be interpreted as indirectly employing a con­
servative and independent central banker, namely the president of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank.
This argument has become widely accepted in the literature; see, 
for example, Melitz (1988), Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), and Cur­
rie, Levine and Pearlman (1992). The main difficulty with it appears 
to be that the parities within the EMS were not irrevocably fixed but 
adjustable, which has been impressively demonstrated during the recent 
crises in the EMS. The question that needs to be addressed therefore is: 
Why could unprecommited European policy makers credibly peg their 
currencies to the Deutsche Mark and thereby import low German infla­
tion, while at the same time they lacked the credibility to pursue a low 
inflation policy when the exchange rate floated?
This phenomenon has usually been explained by political and insti­
tutional rather than immediate economic reasons for the credibility of the
'The nominal exchange rate is said to be pegged if it is held constant while it 
remains adjustable at some less than infinite cost. In contrast, the realignment costs 



























































































EMS. Before the uncertainty regarding the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty surfaced and the EMS experienced its dramatic crisis of Septem­
ber 1992, it had often been argued that its credibility stemmed from the 
credibility of the participants’ commitment to the eventual economic and 
monetary integration implied by the process towards European Union. 
This commitment was considered to be credible because of “wider Euro­
pean political objectives”, which led to substantial changes in the par­
ticipating countries’ policy stances.2 Alternatively, it has been argued 
that the EMS was an agreement among equals, implying that reneging 
on an agreed exchange rate parity is more difficult than on an announced 
internal target. Additional costs may arise because of the possible loss 
of an international reputation, which could lead to a reduced incentive 
to cooperate with the devaluing authority in the future, perhaps in areas 
other than exchange rate policy.
Even though political and institutional reasons might indeed ex­
plain the EMS experience, they are limited to the specific institutional 
and political environment then in existence. Hence the question as to 
why exchange rate pegging has brought about low inflation rates in en­
vironments that were considerably different from the EMS remains. For 
example, Austria and some Scandinavian countries, although not being 
EMS members at the time, have recently achieved relatively low and sta­
ble inflation rates after pegging to certain EMS currencies. Furthermore, 
some countries in Central America have at times unilaterally pegged their 
currencies to the US dollar with essentially the same result. This, for ex­
ample, holds true for Guatemala and Honduras; see Edwards and Losada 
(1994). Finally, exchange rate pegging to a low inflation currency has 
played a key role in almost all historical attempts at stabilization from 
hyperinflations or high inflation; compare Dornbusch and Fischer (1986), 
Bruno, Fischer, Helpman and Liviatan (1991), and Bruno (1993). Re­
cent examples of successful, exchange rate based stabilizations include 
Argentina, Bolivia, Israel, and Mexico.
In light of these facts, the following fundamental problem arises:
2Compare Goodhart (1990), Begg and Wyplosz (1992), Eichengreen (1993b), 




























































































Why should the equilibrium inflation rate be smaller when the nominal 
exchange rate is unilaterally pegged to a foreign low inflation currency 
than when the inflation rate is targeted while the exchange rate floats? 
This question forms the basis of this paper. In addressing it we assume 
for simplicity that precommitment of the foreign central banker ensures 
the credibility of the low foreign inflation rate. Moreover, attention is 
deliberately restricted to a unilateral peg, because this rules out the pos­
sibility that the institutional design of a mutual exchange rate agreement 
like in the EMS is the reason for the credibility gain.
Although the above problem is widely recognized in the literature,3 
it is typically avoided in the formal treatments of policy credibility un­
der a pegged nominal exchange rate. Some authors, including Flood and 
Isard (1989), Obstfeld (1991) and Rasmussen (1993), simply assumed 
the existence of a cost of reneging on the pegged exchange rate agree­
ment, which presumably can be avoided through reneging on a domestic 
target. Others sought to explain the credibility of a pegged exchange 
rate through reputational forces in repeated games. However, they ei­
ther did not address the credibility of a low inflation policy under a 
floating exchange rate [e.g. Horn and Persson (1988) or Andersen and 
Risager (1991)], or simply assumed that this policy is not credible [e.g. 
de Kock and Grilli (1993)]. This is unsatisfactory because within the 
frameworks employed with (relative) purchasing power parity (ppp) as a 
crucial building block, a low inflation policy under a float is equivalent 
to pegging the nominal exchange rate to a low inflation currency.4
On the other hand, the advantages of exchange rate pegging over 
inflation targeting have been articulated clearly albeit informally in the 
literature. To begin with, the nominal exchange rate is more visible than 
the inflation rate because the former is the price of the foreign currency
3 See, among others, Canzoneri and Henderson (1988), Giavazzi and Giovannini 
(1989), Fratianni and von Hagen (1992), Blackburn and Sola (1993), and Eichengreen 
(1993a).
4Agenor (1994) provided an analysis of the credibility of a pegged exchange rate 
in a model that incorporates different sectors for tradables and nontradables and thus 
does not require ppp. However, he did not discuss the alternative policy of money 




























































































in terms of the domestic currency in the single foreign exchange market. 
This price is continuously quoted and not prone to measurement errors 
as is the reported inflation rate, which is calculated periodically by the 
use of price indices. The importance of the visibility (or observability) 
advantage of the nominal exchange rate was, for example, stressed by 
Melitz (1988) in the context of the EMS. It has also been noted fre­
quently in the literature on the design of stabilization programs for high 
inflation countries; see, for example, Bruno (1993, p.135). An additional 
advantage of a pegged exchange rate is that it is more easily controlled. 
A chosen parity that is consistent with the economic fundamentals can 
in principle be perfectly achieved, provided the pegging authority com­
pletely gives up control over its money supply and has command over 
sufficient international reserves.5 In contrast to a pegged exchange rate, 
the inflation rate is endogenous when the authority tries to control the 
money supply while the exchange rate floats. Thus a low inflation target 
is inherently not perfectly achievable, due to uncontrollable factors influ­
encing the money supply, to the instability of money demand, and to the 
uncertain time lag with which changes in base money are transmitted to 
inflation.
In summary, the nominal exchange rate is both more clearly ob­
served and more easily controlled and thus more transparent than the 
inflation rate. This has often been claimed to be the reason why a low 
inflation policy is more credible under exchange rate pegging than under 
inflation targeting; see, for example, Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989, p. 
103). However, formally the relationship between the transparency of 
the exchange rate regime and the credibility of the ex ante optimal low 
inflation policy has not been modelled. The present paper attempts to 
close this gap. In sections 2 and 3, a two country open economy version of 
Canzoneri’s (1985) closed economy model is presented. The effect of the
5 Since the policy maker can then defend the exchange rate peg without limitations, 
problems related to speculative attacks are assumed away. Moreover, the consistency 
with the economic fundamentals excludes scenarios from the analysis in which the 
policy maker tries to peg the exchange rate and to control the domestic money sup­
ply at the same time. For example, the paper does not address the situations in 
most Southern European countries before the 1992 crisis of the EMS, where domestic 




























































































different exchange rate regimes on the equilibrium inflation rate is ana­
lyzed within two standard policy games in the two subsequent sections. 
In particular, section 4 studies an infinitely repeated game. Indepen­
dently of the policy regime, the policy maker is assumed to be able to 
precommit partially to plan the ex ante optimal low inflation rate. Par­
tial precommitment is modeled as a finite cost that he incurs for detected 
surprises. In section 5, a finitely repeated signalling policy game in the 
spirit of Backus and Drifhll (1985) is presented. An additional source of 
uncertainty arises in this game because it is unknown whether the policy 
maker can (fully) precommit or has discretion. For both policy games it 
is shown that there exist parameter configurations for which a low infla­
tion outcome is a Nash equilibrium only under a pegged exchange rate; 
an inflationary bias thus arises under inflation targeting. The implica­
tions and limitations of this result are discussed in the concluding section 
6 .
2 A Two Country Open Econom y M odel
The framework used is a synthesis of Canzoneri’s (1985) and Obstfeld’s 
(1991) extensions of the model proposed by Barro and Gordon (1983).
2.1 T h e  D o m estic  E con om y
The domestic economy is populated by a large number of identical and 
rational individuals. A representative individual supplies labor in a com­
petitively organized labor market. As is standard in the literature, the 
representative individual is assumed to aim for equilibrium output when 
negotiating the nominal wage for the next period. This leads to the de­
termination of real output by an expectation augmented Phillips curve,
Vt — x t — 0{nt -  net -  & ) .  ( 1)
The following notation is used in (1): yt and xt denote the logarithms of 




























































































the realized inflation rate and for the rational inflation expectation for 
period t. The realized inflation rate is defined as the difference between 
the logs of the current and the previous price level, tt, = p, —pt~\ and the 
inflation expectation is formed at the end of period t-1 conditional on the 
available information, I t-\, i.e. 7r| =  E(nt\It~i). Finally, as in Obstfeld 
(1991), £( represents an independently and identically distributed pro­
ductivity shock, which has a zero unconditional mean, a finite variance, 
and is not predictable at the end of period t-1,
& i-i-d. (0,<x|) and =  0. (2)
We assume that prices in the economy are perfectly flexible and 
result from equilibrium in the money market, which is described by the 
simple quantity equation6
mt + vt = x t + pt, (3)
where mt and vt denote the logs of the nominal money supply and of the 
velocity. The money supply is assumed to be the policy instrument under 
the control of the authority. Following Canzoneri (1985), we model the 
well recognized instability of money demand by the assumption that the 
logarithm of the velocity follows a random walk,
vt = v t- \ +<pu where <pt i.i.d. (0, <r£) and = 0. (4)
This leads to the familiar dependence of the realized inflation rate on 
the realized growth rate of the money supply, mt, the growth rate of the 
equilibrium output, xt, and the realization of the velocity (or demand) 
shock pt,
7rt — mt -  xt + <pt. (5)
(5) realistically implies that control over inflation is imperfect due to the
6Note that as in Canzoneri (1985), equilibrium output, x t, instead of realized out­
put, yt, enters (3) for simplicity. Using yt would lead to the “unpleasant” dependence 
of the price level on the rate of inflation, and thus to the dependence of the inflation 




























































































occurrence of velocity shocks.7
Finally, the preferences of the policy maker need to be specified. 
The present discounted value in period t of his current and future period- 
by-period utility is represented by a standard quadratic specification
Vt =  Y ,  E  P'~l [y(yi ~ xi -  + ^i] < (6)
1 i=t Z i=t
where (3 E (0,1) is a discount factor and T  the number of periods the 
policy game is played. Whether T  is smaller or equal to oo will vary 
throughout the paper depending on the version of the policy game con­
sidered.
Underlying equation (6) is the assumption that the policy maker 
gains from positive deviations of real output from its equilibrium value, 
which is reflected by the constant k. That x, is too low from the pol­
icy maker’s point of view may for instance be due to distortions in the 
labor market.8 Moreover (6) reflects the notion that the policy maker 
suffers loss from nonzero realized inflation because of the standard costs 
of inflation; for detailed discussion, see, for example, Drifflll, Mizon and 
Ulph (1990). The parameter c is the weight of the gain from positive 
deviations of output from equilibrium relative to the loss from realized 
inflation. The higher c, the more the policy maker trades off higher 
inflation for higher output.9
7Notice that in reality the policy maker’s control over the money supply is also 
likely to be imperfect, but this distinction between planned and realized money growth 
is not modeled here because it would not add any additional insight.
8 Note that this could also result when a trade union negotiates nominal wage 
contracts that are in the interest of only part of the labor force.
9 The objective function (6) has often been interpreted as a social welfare function 
as was originally proposed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon 
(1983). However, it may also be motivated by a political approach that leads to a 
positive theory of monetary policy. This was advocated by Cukierman and Meltzer 




























































































2.2 T h e  Foreign  E con om y and th e  E xch an ge R a te
The domestic and the foreign economy are identical in all but two aspects. 
On the one hand, productivity shocks possibly affect foreign output dif­
ferently to domestic output. For simplicity, this asymmetry is modeled 
by the assumption that there are no foreign productivity shocks. De­
noting foreign variables by a superscript *, foreign output is thus given
by
y t - * t =  -  < e) .  ( T )
On the other hand, it is assumed that the foreign policy maker is pre- 
commited to the ex ante optimal policy to be derived below, and that 
this is common knowledge.10 In contrast, the domestic policy maker is 
not necessarily precommited.
The nominal exchange rate, et. between the domestic and the for­
eign country is defined as the price of the foreign currency in terms of the 
domestic currency. Postulating the validity of relative purchasing power 
parity (ppp), the nominal exchange rate is determined by
et = a ^ ,  (8)
Pt
where a is some constant.11 The rate of nominal exchange rate depreci­
ation, et, must then equal the difference between the domestic and the 
foreign inflation rates,
e< =  TTt — (9)
Provided that the foreign policy maker sets the money supply and 
does not manage the exchange rate, the domestic policy maker can choose 
between floating and a unilaterally pegged nominal exchange rate.12 On 
the one hand, when he targets domestic inflation by using the nominal
10 A policy maker that is precommited to a certain policy rule follows that rule by 
definition, independently of whether this is ex post optimal.
11See Horn and Persson (1988), Obstfeld (1991), or Rasmussen (1993) for a similar 
assumption in open economy policy games.
12For a policy game model of a bilateral exchange rate peg on which both policy 




























































































money supply as his instrument, the nominal exchange rate floats. The 
rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation is then given by (9). On the 
other hand, he may unilaterally peg the nominal exchange rate, implying 
et =  0. The policy maker then has to buy the resulting excess supply of 
the domestic currency in the foreign exchange market, and consequently 
to give up control over the domestic money supply.13 From (9), the real­
ized domestic inflation rate under an exchange rate peg is endogenously 
determined by the realized foreign inflation rate, irt = 7T*.
3 The Policy Game
In this section, the policy game is described. In subsection 3.1, the 
one shot version is defined with particular emphasis on the timing of 
events and the informational structure. In the following subsection, the 
outcome of the one shot version is derived for alternative policies and 
exchange rate regimes. Finally, subsection 3.3 provides a discussion of 
the differences between the informational structure in the one shot game 
and in the repeated game.
3.1 T h e  In form ation a l S tru ctu re  in  th e  O ne Shot 
G am e
Assuming that both the policy maker and a representative individual 
follow noncooperative Nash-strategies, the policy game in any period t 
proceeds as follows: At the end of the previous period, the representative 
individual forms inflation expectations, 7r®, conditional on its information 
set It-\. On the basis of 7r(e, it then negotiates a nominal wage for period t 
so as to achieve equilibrium real output. Its information set It~i contains 
the model structure, all parameter values, and the distributions of <pt, ipt,
13Note that in practice an exchange rate peg is likely to be implemented by pegging 
the domestic nominal interest rate. This feature could be captured by adding an 
uncovered interest parity relation to the present model. In addition, the velocity in 




























































































and f t. In forming expectations the policy maker’s reaction function is 
taken as given.
The policy maker is assumed to make his decisions at the beginning 
of period t after individuals have decided about their labor supply. In 
order to model a role for stabilization policy, the informational structure 
is as follows: Before he decides, some information about the realizations 
of the two disturbances tpt and f t becomes available, which individuals 
did not know when forming their inflation expectations. As in Canzoneri 
(1985), the policy maker is supposed to learn about part of the realization 
of the velocity shock ipt. Denoting this part by <pt, ipt may be decomposed 
into (pt and a shock which he cannot predict because it materializes 
after the money supply is determined,
<pt = <pt + *l>u where ipt i.i.d. (0,<^) and E(ipt\It U ipt) = 0. (10)
After substitution of (10) into (5), the realized inflation rate results as 
the sum of the inflation rate planned by the policy maker and the unpre­
dictable shock ipt,
* t  =  * t  +  i> t ,  ( 11)
where
7if =  mt -  xt +  ipt- (12)
Concerning the productivity shock, it is assumed that ft is fully 
revealed after wage contracts have been negotiated but before the money 
supply is chosen. Moreover, this realization is supposed to be common 
knowledge.14 The information set, It, on which the policy maker bases 
his decisions in period t may then be written as
It = I t-1 U&U ft, (13)
14As an example, one might think of a shock to the international prices of some 
imported materials, which certainly is observable by both individuals and the policy 
maker. Note that one could also parallel the assumption made about the shock <j>j, 
i.e. that the policy maker learns about only part of the productivity shock ft- However, 





























































































implying /,_! C /<•
After having explained the informational structure, we now turn 
to the description of the policy maker’s behavior. We fist observe, that 
the substitution of (1) and (11) into (6) leads to a version of the policy 
objective in terms of planned and expected inflation,
Vt = F~l [cK  +  & -  K  -  & -  k)2 +  W  +  V',-)2], (14)
Z *=t
where c = c92 and k =  k/$. Hence, independently of the exchange rate 
regime, we may describe the policy maker’s strategy in terms of choosing 
a planned inflation rate: At the beginning of period t, he determines 7rf 
so as to maximizes the expectation of his utility vt conditioned on It. In 
doing so the policy maker takes inflation expectations as given.
In the two exchange rate regimes under consideration, the planned 
rate of inflation is achieved in different ways. On the one hand, when the 
exchange rate floats, (12) implies that the money supply is to be set as
rht = 7if +  xt -  i f f  (15)
On the other hand, given the exchange rate regime is a peg, it can be seen 
from (9) that a planned inflation rate of 7if results from a devaluation of
et = K  ~  Jr<p- (16)
Notice that in order to calculate this rate of devaluation the domestic pol­
icy maker needs to know to which inflation rate the foreign policy maker 
is precommited. Inter alia, this is discussed in the following subsection.
3.2 T h e  O u tcom es o f  th e  O ne S h ot G am e
3.2.1 Precommitment
First, the equilibrium is derived when the domestic policy maker has 




























































































ear quadratic, the equilibrium policy rule must be an element from the 
following set of contingent rules:
7Z = {7rf | 7rf =  a£t + b, a,b constant}. (17)
Part A of an appendix shows that it is ex ante optimal to precommit to 
the domestic policy rule
*t(opt) = (18)1 +  c
which calls for partly offsetting the productivity shock £t. The more the 
policy maker values the loss from a deviation of realized from equilibrium 
output (i.e. the larger is c), the more actively he stabilizes. However, 
is never fully offset because realized inflation is costly. Given the 
policy maker precommits to (18), a representative individual expects 
zero inflation because E(£t\It~i) = 0.
The foreign policy maker is precommited to the foreign analogue 
of (18). Since there are no foreign productivity shocks in the model 
economy, the ex ante optimal foreign inflation rate is
ihP{opt) = 0, (19)
implying ir*e(opt) =  0 and n*(opt) = .
If the domestic and the foreign policy maker are precommited to 
(18) and (19), respectively, relative purchasing power parity (9) leads to
eflopt) = — & + tpt~ ipt and ert (opt) = — £t, (20)
implying that the exchange rate necessarily floats. On the other hand, 
an exchange rate peg corresponds to a degenerate contingent rule, i.e.
7T? {peg) = n*tP(opt) = 0, 7r(e (peg) =  tt*te(opt) =  0, n t(peg) = tt* (opt) = tp*t ,
(21)
which prevents accommodation of domestic productivity shocks. Peg­




























































































inflation. Notice that by (5) and (21), the domestic money growth under 
a peg is endogenously determined by the relation
rht{peg) =  ip* + x t -  <pt. (22)
For future reference, we calculate the expected utilities of the policy 
maker’s in period t under both rules. Since expected inflation depends on 
the policy regime in operation, it is appropriate to talee the expectation 
conditional on the information set It-\. Substituting (18) into (14), one 
finds
(23)E(yt(opt) ]/<_!) =  - -  +  c*2 +  (1 +  c)a
Similarly, one gets for a peg
E{v t(peg)\lt- i )  = cal + CK‘2 + C1 + c)°%- (24)
Comparing (23) and (24) immediately leads to
Lemma 1 In the one shot game, the difference between the policy 
maker’s expected utilities under precommitment to the ex ante optimal 
policy rule and to a pegged exchange rate amounts to
E{yt(opt) -  vt(peg)\lt- i)  =  ̂ +  (! +  ~ r f) (25)
If c > 0 and a then the ex ante optimal policy rule yields a 
larger expected value of the policy objective than a pegged exchange 
rate. Intuitively the reason is that under a regime of inflation targeting 
the policy maker finds it optimal to accommodate productivity shocks 
even though he could clearly chose not to as is implied by a pegged 
exchange rate. However, this intuition is no longer appropriate if the 
foreign policy maker can control inflation much more accurately than 
the domestic policy maker, i.e.




























































































If this condition is met in the one shot game, then the domestic policy 
maker prefers precommitment to a pegged exchange rate.
3.2.2 Discretion
If precommitment is not feasible in the one shot game, then the domestic 
policy maker has discretion and chooses the ex post optimal policy. As 
is widely recognized in the literature originated by the seminal paper 
of Kydland and Prescott (1977), the ex ante optimal policy rule cannot 
be an equilibrium under discretion, because it is time inconsistent. Put 
differently, it leaves an ex post incentive to stimulate output through 
the creation of surprise inflation in excess of that is called for by (18). 
In equilibrium a representative individual therefore expects an inflation 
rate for which there is no ex post incentive to deviate. In part B of the 
appendix the discretionary equilibrium outcome of the one shot game is 
proved to be
c
TTt(dis) = + Cfi and TTf(dis) = CK. (27)
By construction the Nash-equilibrium (27) is time consistent. As is stan­
dard, it exhibits an inflationary bias of c k . Moreover, notice that under 
discretion, pegging the exchange rate is not a Nash-equilibrium, implying 
that the exchange rate necessarily floats.
The conditional expected utility under discretion is found to equal
£(ut(dis)|j(_i) = +  Ĉ  + Ĉ 2 + + c)aV (28)
It clearly is smaller than the analogue (23) under precommitment, wit­
ness of the unwanted inflationary bias. However, it is not a priori clear 
whether discretion or precommitment to a pegged exchange rate results 
in a higher expected utility. The comparison of (28) with (24) proves the 
following Lemma:




























































































values of the policy maker’s utility under discretion and under precom­
mitment to a pegged exchange rate is
E (yt(d is ) -v t(peg)\lt_1) =  ^  -  c2/c2 +  (1 +  c)(o^. -  ctJ )  . (29)
Hence, precommitment to a pegged exchange rate is preferable if
(1 +c) o f -2ut 1 +  C«2 < V (30)
Similarly to the discussion after Lemma 1, this clearly is the case when 
the domestic policy maker can control inflation relatively imprecisely. In 
contrast, even if o = cr|, precommitment to a peg may or may not be 
preferable compared to discretion. The reason is that, on the one hand, 
precommitment to an exchange rate peg eliminates the discretionary in­
flation bias. On the other hand, it prevents the accommodation of do­
mestic productivity shocks that the precommited foreign policy maker 
does not account for when setting the money supply. While the first ef­
fect increases expected utility, the second one decreases it, which results 
in an ambiguous net effect.
3.3 T h e  T ran sp arency Issu e in  th e  R ep ea ted  P o licy  
G am e
The previous subsection has shown that in the one shot game the infor­
mational structure does not depend on the exchange rate regime. This no 
longer holds true when the game is repeated for a finite or infinite num­
ber of times. In the repeated game the individual information sets, It- \ 1 
also contain all observable realizations of past variables, in particular, 
the observed realizations of past inflation. Reflecting the transparency 
difference that results from the controllability difference between the in­
flation rate and the exchange rate, the sets 7t_! differ between a floating 
and a pegged nominal exchange rate regime.




























































































does not exercise control over the domestic money supply), an unexpected 
domestic velocity shock leads to offsetting changes in the international 
reserves and the domestic money supply while the exchange rate and 
the domestic inflation rate remain unchanged. Moreover, given that the 
foreign central banker is precommited to a low inflation rate and that 
relative purchasing power parity holds, pegging the nominal exchange 
rate unambiguously implies that the domestic policy maker planned the 
low foreign inflation rate.15 Hence a velocity shock does not give rise to 
any doubt about the actions of the domestic policy maker.
In contrast, when the domestic policy maker controls the money 
supply while the nominal exchange rate floats freely, a domestic velocity 
shock that he could not forecast may lead to an unexpected increase of 
the domestic rate of inflation in excess of what is called for to offset op­
timally the productivity shock f*. In order to verify whether the surprise 
was caused by the authority in an attempt to stimulate output exces­
sively, <pt must be known to a representative individual; compare (13). 
However, as Canzoneri (1985) pointed out, <pt is necessarily the policy 
maker’s private information, because it is not incentive compatible to 
reveal it correctly when surprise inflation is perceived as being beneficial. 
A rational policy maker would simply understate <ft  and claim that the 
excess inflation surprise deliberately created by him is in fact due to an 
unforecastable shock. As a consequence of not knowing ift, individuals 
cannot decompose Trt into 7if and ipt', compare (11). For this reason, the 
inflation rate planned by the policy maker is his private information.16
There is an implicit but crucial assumption underlying the previ­
ous discussion, notably that the nominal exchange rate can be perfectly 
controlled when control over the domestic money supply is relinquished. 
This implies that situations are excluded from the analysis in which the 
domestic policy maker does not have command over a stock of interna­
15It should be pointed out that although foreign velocity shocks will give rise to 
domestic inflation surprises under a pegged exchange rate, this is irrelevant in the 
present context since the source of these surprises is unambiguously foreign.
16Note that from (5), individuals can compute the realizations of ipt from the obser­
vations of 7r(, rht, and xt. However this does not reveal which share of ipt was known 




























































































tional reserves sufficiently large to buy the excess supply of the domestic 
currency in the foreign exchange market. Furthermore, speculative at­
tacks are assumed away through the requirement that the peg be consis­
tent with the economic fundamentals determining the nominal exchange 
rate.
It should be pointed out that while in the present set-up the in­
complete information about the policy maker’s actions stems from the 
less than perfect control over the inflation rate, it could also have been 
derived from the incomplete observability of inflation. As mentioned in 
the introduction, inflation is in reality measured periodically and by the 
use of price indices. These measurements are often thought to be sub­
stantially inaccurate, for example, because of the uncertain time lag with 
which actual price changes are measured or because of the composition 
of the price index employed. Hence a similar incomplete information 
problem as above would be present if one accounted for the fact that a 
representative individual can only observe the measured inflation rate, 
i.e. the sum of the true inflation rate plus a measurement error.
To sum up, in the repeated policy game individuals know the pol­
icy maker’s planned inflation rates for previous periods only when the 
exchange rate is pegged. Hence exchange rate pegging is a more trans­
parent policy than inflation targeting under a floating exchange rate. In 
fact the information available under exchange rate pegging and incom­
plete information about ipt is equivalent to the information that would 
be available under inflation targeting if there were complete information 
about <pt, that is, if Cpt were common knowledge.
4 Partial Precom m itm ent in an Infinitely  
R epeated  Policy Game
As in the one shot game there are two benchmark cases to be distin­
guished: On the one hand, if the policy maker has (full) discretion, then 
the Nash-equilibrium (27) of the one shot game will also be the unique 




























































































independently of the exchange rate regime. This holds true, because 
there are no dynamics in the standard version of the Barro and Gordon 
model.17 On the other hand, if the policy maker can (fully) precommit 
to any policy rule, he will clearly find it optimal to precommit to the ex 
ante optimal policy rule (18) in all periods; the exchange rate then floats.
The choice of the exchange rate regime possibly affects the equi­
librium outcome in “intermediate cases” only. The policy maker then 
neither has (full) discretion nor access to (full) precommitment, but in­
stead can precommit only partially to a policy rule from the set 1Z. More 
precisely, partial precommitment to a rule is defined by the existence of 
a finite cost that is incurred after a detected deviation from the rule. The 
requirement that a deviation must be detected to be costly is important 
in the present context of incomplete information about the policy maker’s 
actions. It implies realistically that the creation of excess surprise infla­
tion, that is, of surprise inflation that is not justified by the chosen policy 
rule, is not costly for the policy maker as long as the public erroneously 
attributes this excess inflation to the occurrence of a positive realization 
of the disturbance ipt-
As will become clear in a moment, this feature of the present model 
allows one to derive the possible credibility advantages of exchange rate 
pegging without making the usual ad hoc assumption that the costs of 
reneging on the policy rule implied by an exchange rate peg are larger 
than the ones of reneging on the ex ante optimal policy under a float. 
Instead, we assume that a detected deviation from any rule in 1Z ex post 
causes the same costs and proceed to show that ex ante the expected 
costs are higher for a deviation from a pegged exchange rate. In doing 
so, the present value of the costs from a detected deviation is denoted 
by K  and is for analytical convenience taken to be constant. This has 
become common in the literature; see, for instance, Flood and Isard 
(1989), Obstfeld (1991), Cukierman (1992,p.99), or Rasmussen (1993).18
17In more elaborate specifications, current decisions would affect future decisions. 
Drazen and Masson (1994), for example, establish an intertemporal link by introduc­
ing unemployment persistence.
18Reputational effects are one frequently used motivation for the existence of such 




























































































The remainder of this section is organized as follows: In the next 
subsection, the equilibrium of the policy game is studied given that the 
policy regime is a float. In subsection 4.2, the game is analyzed under 
exchange rate pegging. Finally, a condition is derived in subsection 4.3 
under which exchange rate pegging leads to an equilibrium outcome with 
a lower (average) inflation rate. Moreover, given this is true, we discuss 
when the policy maker actually finds it in his interest to peg the exchange 
rate.
4.1 In fla tion  T argetin g  under P a rtia l P reco m m it-  
m en t
We now derive the conditions under which the ex ante optimal outcome is 
a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium of the repeated policy game, given 
the inflation rate is targeted and precommitment is only partial. In doing 
so, it is useful to make specific assumptions on the productivity shock 
and the control error ipt- Both disturbances are taken to be identi­
cally, independently, and uniformly distributed. Denoting the compact 
supports by [— and [— one has er| =  s |/3  and =  s^/3. 
Furthermore, the density functions are given by
/(6 )  =  ^ “  and =  0 < S(, Sj, < oo. (31)
Although a uniform distribution of ipt may at first sight be associated 
with a rather imprecise control of the inflation rate, it should be kept in 
mind that a small support may in fact allow for very accurate control.19
strategies”; see, for example, Barro and Gordon (1983), Horn and Persson (1988), 
de Kock and Grilli (1993), or Agenor (1994). However, this approach is problematic 
because the folk theorem implies the existence of a multiplicity of possible equilibria. 
As pointed out by, among others, Backus and Driffill (1985) and Rogoff (1987), it 
is therefore not clear how individuals in a competitive labor market can coordinate 
on playing any one of the possible equilibrium strategies. This coordination problem 
might be less severe if individual inflation expectations can be coordinated by the 
existence of a trade union; see al Nowaihi and Levine (1994) for a further discussion.
19Note that Canzoneri (1985) analyzed a similar incomplete information problem 




























































































Suppose that a representative individual expects the ex ante opti­
mal policy (18) for period t, i.e. 7rte(opt) =  0. On the one hand, if the ex 
ante optimal inflation rate is targeted in all periods, then the expected 
discounted value of the sum of all utilities from period t onward follows 
from (14) as
E {yt(oPt)\it) = - 2(1 +  c) L 
1
'2(1 - 0 )
£t + 2£f« +
ck2 +  (1 +  c)a2
P 2 
l - P  *
.2
«/> (32)
On the other hand, the policy maker may plan to deviate from the ex 
ante optimal rule in period t through the creation of surprise inflation,* 20
7T t(dev) 1 + c e > 0.
(33)
The expected discounted period t value of the sum of all future utilities 
after such a deviation is
E {vt(dev)\it) = E (y t(opt)\it) ^  e2 + P{e)K  — ck£ , (34)
where P{e) =  mm{l, e/(2s^,)} is the probability that after a planned 
deviation of e the realized inflation rate is larger than s^. The deviation 
then is detected because this realization of 7rt would be impossible if the 
policy maker followed (18). Hence P(e) is the probability with which the 
policy maker actually incurs the cost K  when deviating by e. The incom­
plete information problem about the policy maker’s actions determines 
whether this probability is less than one.
The ex ante optimal policy is sustainable as a subgame perfect 
Nash-equilibrium of the infinitely repeated policy game under inflation 
targeting, if and only if the expected utility of the authority for any 
deviation e > 0 is not larger than the one for the ex ante optimal rule
derived now. A uniform distribution is mainly assumed here to maintain analytical 
tractability in the signalling game of the subsequent section.





























































































Appendix C contains the derivation of a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for (35) to be true:
Lemma 3 Under the policy regime of inflation targeting, the ex ante op­
timal policy rule is a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium of the infinitely 
repeated game if and only if
Hence, given a cost K, if the policy maker can control the inflation rate
attaches to output stimulation are not too large, then the ex ante optimal 
policy is sustainable when he targets the inflation rate under a floating 
exchange rate. This holds true despite the lack of full precommitment. In 
the opposite case, the incomplete information problem creates too large 
a possible net gain from excess surprise inflation, because the probability 
with which a deviation is detected is too low. The ex ante optimal 
inflation policy rule is then not sustainable as a Nash-equilibrium under 
a regime of inflation targeting.
In part D of the appendix, the Nash-equilibrium inflation rate is 
characterized provided condition (36) is violated. This leads to
Lemma 4 If the ex ante optimal policy rule is not sustainable under 
inflation targeting, then the equilibrium policy rule of the infinitely re­
peated game exhibits an inflationary bias on average,
2cksj, < K. (36)
































































































The inflationary bias petc is the larger, the larger the relative weight c 
attached to output stimulation, the larger the distortion k, and the less 
precise the control over the inflation rate (i.e. the larger s^). In the 
limiting case of totally imperfect inflation control, i.e. close to oo, the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game under partial 
commitment in every period is the discretionary policy rule (27) of the 
one shot game.
In summary, although following the ex ante optimal policy rule (18) 
in each period is clearly preferable, it may not be feasible when precom­
mitment is only partial. This is due to the incomplete controllability 
of inflation and the resulting incomplete information about the policy 
maker’s actions, which reduces the expected cost of deviating from the 
ex ante optimal policy rule. Therefore it is of interest to find out whether 
the policy rule implied by an exchange rate peg is supportable as a sub­
game perfect Nash equilibrium under partial precommitment, and also 
under what conditions this rule leads to a higher expected utility than 
(37).
4.2 E xch an ge R a te  P eg g in g  under P a rtia l P recom -  
m itm en t
As explained above, every creation of unexpected inflation through a 
devaluation is detected when the nominal exchange rate is pegged, and 
there is no incomplete information problem about the actions of the 
policy maker. It is thus fairly straightforward to determine when a given 
cost I\ is sufficiently large to deter unexpected devaluations of the pegged 
exchange rate. Provided individuals expect the nominal exchange rate 
to be pegged, the domestic policy maker has two options:
On the one hand, if he does not devalue in period t, then the 
planned rate of domestic period t inflation equals zero. After substituting 




























































































of the discounted sum of all utilities from period t onward follows as
E(Vt{peg)\it) + 2£tK + \ - p
1
2(1 -  0) CK2 +  (1  +  c ) a L (39)
On the other hand, given that Ii is fixed and that individual inflation 
expectation are zero, the optimal rate of surprise inflation in case of a 
devaluation can be shown to equal £ = c(ft + k) /(1 +  c). This rate of 
surprise inflation rate is achieved by an unexpected devaluation of the 
same magnitude, leading to
E(Vt(dev)\it) = E{Vt{peg)\it)
c2
2(1 +  c) (6 +  0 2 •
(40)
The exchange rate peg is sustainable as a subgame perfect Nash- 
equilibrium of the infinitely repeated policy game, if and only if the con­
ditional expected utility of the authority after the (optimal) devaluation 
is not larger than after pegging the exchange rate. Using (40), this can, 
for any given € [— be written as
W ^ 7 ) {it + K)2~ K - (41)
Since the productivity shock is revealed after wages are negotiated 
and before money demand is determined, (41) has to be satisfied for all 
possible values of £t.21 Hence we get the following result:
Lemma 5 In the infinitely repeated policy game, exchange rate peg­
ging is a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium if and only if
>’ * * ■  (42)
21 Exchange rate escape clauses that allow for a devaluation when an unusual large 
shock materializes are not considered here. For a discussion of the sense and nonsense 




























































































As above, provided partial precommitment is strong enough, it will be 
optimal for the policy maker not to devalue the nominal exchange rate 
unexpectedly though he is not fully precommited. For a given value of 
K,  this is more likely to hold true, the smaller are the relative costs c 
of deviations of real output from equilibrium and the distortion k. More 
interestingly, the support of the asymmetric productivity shock £ also 
needs to be small enough if the peg is to be sustainable as a Nash- 
equilibrium. In contrast, when too large a realization of £ is possible, 
then exchange rate pegging is not a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium, 
because the possible gain from offsetting a devaluation can be too large.
4.3 Im p orts o f  C red ib ility  T h rou gh  E xch an ge  R ate  
P eg g in g
Comparing the two equilibrium conditions (36) and (42), one finds
Proposition 1 In the infinitely repeated policy game, the following con­
dition is necessary and sufficient so as to ensure that the ex ante optimal 
policy rule is a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium when the exchange 
rate is pegged but not when the inflation rate is targeted:
c2
2(1 +  c) (a* +  ^  -  K  -  2c k s (43)
A necessary condition for (43) to be fulfilled is that the support of the 
domestic productivity shock is small relative to the support of the do­
mestic control error. (43) will certainly be satisfied if the first inequality 
holds and if sy is very large, i.e. if control over inflation is very imprecise. 
The discretionary policy rule (27) then is the Nash-equilibrium under a 
float in every period; compare (37). Hence there exist parameter values 
such that partial precommitment to exchange rate pegging is possible, 
and at the same time the discretionary outcome of the one shot game 
obtains in every period when the exchange rate floats. A distinct feature 




























































































rived from the transparency difference between both policy regimes. In 
contrast, it is usually justified by ad hoc assumptions in the literature on 
the credibility effects of exchange rate pegging; see, for example, Currie 
et al. (1992) or de Kock and Grilli (1993).
Given (43) holds, two policy rules are feasible, notably xt(peg) as 
implied by exchange rate pegging and the contingent rule nubias) as 
given by (37) under a float. It is therefore useful to take the analysis 
one step further and allow for the endogenous choice of the exchange 
rate regime. This choice needs to be made and announced before wages 
are negotiated, because individual inflation expectations depend on the 
policy regime in operation. Provided both policy rules are sustainable, 
the rule with the higher expectation of utility (conditional on It-\)  will 
be the policy maker’s equilibrium choice. In part E of the appendix the 
following is proved:
Proposition 2 An exchange rate peg is the preferred policy regime in 
the infinitely policy game, if and only if
Y ^rcal  ^  (PCK)2 + (l + c ){a l~ a l.) .  (44)
The left hand side of this condition represents an upper bound for the 
possible costs of pegging the exchange rate. These costs are incurred 
because it is impossible to accommodate the asymmetric productivity 
shock when the exchange rate is pegged. The expected gains from ex­
change rate pegging are shown on the right hand side. The first term 
captures the expected inflationary bias under floating due to the incom­
plete information about the policy maker’s actions. The second term 
represents the difference between the expected domestic and foreign cost 
of incomplete control over inflation. This term reflects the fact that, if 
the foreign authority can control the inflation rate more precisely than 
the domestic one, then pegging the exchange rate results in a reduction 
of the variance of inflation and thus in an additional expected gain.22




























































































Hence an exchange rate peg is the more likely to result as the equilib­
rium regime, the smaller is the support (and hence the variance) of the 
domestic productivity shock, the larger is the inflationary bias under a 
float, and the more imprecise is control over domestic inflation relative 
to the foreign country.
In summary, provided that the two conditions (43) and (44) hold, an 
exchange rate peg is the equilibrium policy regime. Since in this case peg­
ging the exchange rate eliminates the (average) inflationary bias arising 
under inflation targeting, it may be interpreted as importing credibility 
from the foreign policy maker, who is credible because he was initially 
assumed to be fully precommited. The import of credibility is paid for 
by the costs of not offsetting asymmetric productivity shocks.
One weakness of this interpretation is that it reduces the notion of 
a credibility import to a reduction of the average equilibrium inflation 
rate. For this reason, a second example is now provided, in which the 
concept of credibility is more meaningfully defined.
5 A Finitely R epeated  Policy Gam e with  
Incom plete Inform ation about the Policy  
M aker’s Type
In this second example, the analysis is restricted to a finite number of 
periods, which for reasons of analytical tractability is taken to be two. 
As it stands the unique Nash-equilibrium of the finitely repeated game 
would be the discretionary policy rule in any period of the game because 
of the well known “backwards unraveling effect”. For this reason, it is 
assumed, as in the seminal paper of Backus and Driffill (1985), that there 
exist two possible types of policy makers, a strong one (denoted S) and a 
weak one (denoted W). The strong type is precommited to a policy rule 
that implies zero expected inflation. The two examples of such policy
shift, e.g. the implementation of a stabilization program. This holds true since money 




























































































rules considered below are the rule implied by a pegged exchange rate 
and the ex ante optimal policy rule. In contrast, the weak type has 
discretion to plan the inflation rate that ex post maximizes his utility
(14),
V0 = v0 + Pvi =  /?' [c(7if + ip t-  7rte -  6  -  *02 +  W  + A )2] • (45)
At the beginning of the game, a representative individual does not know 
which type it is facing, but holds a prior belief in form of a probability 
/id that the policy maker is strong, p0 £ [0,1]. This probability is usually 
referred to as the pre-game reputation for being strong. After the first 
period, the realized inflation rate is observed and the representative in­
dividual updates the pre-game reputation for being strong according to 
Bayes rule. On the basis of this update it forms inflationary expectations 
for the second period. As is standard by now, the appropriate solution 
concept for this class of games is the one of sequential equilibrium.23
In the remainder of this section, the policy game is analyzed given 
the exchange rate regime is either a peg (subsection 5.1) or a float (sub­
section 5.2). Subsection 5.3 then deals with the effects of the exchange 
rate regime choice on credibility and summarizes.
5.1 P o o lin g  under E xch an ge R a te  P eg g in g
As in the previous example, the planned rate of inflation under a pegged 
exchange rate is unambiguously zero and there is no uncertainty about 
the government’s actions. It is assumed that the strong policy maker 
is precommited to peg the exchange rate, implying that he plans zero 
inflation. We now derive a condition under which the weak policy maker
23Examples for related signalling policy games when the nominal exchange rate 
is the policy instrument include Horn and Persson (1988), Andersen and Risager 
(1991), and Agenor (1994). In contrast, the inflation rate was the policy instrument in, 
among others, Backus and Drifflll (1985), Barro (1986), Vickers (1986), RogofF (1989), 
and Cukierman and Liviatan (1991), who all assumed that inflation can perfectly be 
controlled. Signalling policy games with imperfect control over the inflation rate were 




























































































also finds it optimal not to devalue the exchange rate, thereby mimicking 
the action of the strong policy maker. However, in all sequential equilibria 
of the finitely repeated policy game, the weak policy maker will chose to 
devalue in the last period because he has discretion and this is ex post 
optimal. All one can therefore hope for is an equilibrium where the weak 
type pegs the exchange rate in the first period of the game. Such a 
sequential equilibrium is called a pooling equilibrium:
s  (peg,pool, S) = (0,0), (46.a)
S{peg,pool, W) = (n%(peg,pool), (peg,pool))
= (0, ft i (peg, pool)), (46.b)
where ni(peg,pool) is the ex post optimal policy rule under discretion. 
Since there is no updating of beliefs in a pooling equilibrium, inflation 
expectations for the second period are given by
tt®(peg,pool) =  p0-0 + ( l-p 0)K(peg,pool) = ( l - / i o X (peg,pool). (47)
Using this and following exactly the same steps as for the derivation of 
(27), appendix B shows that
c c
ei (peg,pool) -  Jif (peg,pool) = — —£i +  — ----- k. (48)1 +  c 1 + p0c
Hence the weak policy maker’s expected utility in the pooling equilibrium 
can be written as:
E ( y 0(peg,pool)\i0) =  - - c(£o + K)1 + 0 C _2 ■ O c ( l+ c )  2
1  +  C  ?  ( 1  +  p 0 c ) 2
(1 + c)(l +  f3)o2 (49)
A devaluation in the first period unambiguously reveals the weak 
policy maker’s type, implying that the discretionary outcome is expected 
for the second period,
(peg, dev) = ck. (50)




























































































devaluation that maximizes the conditional expectation of his first period 
utility. Since individual inflation expectations for the first period are zero 
in a pooling equilibrium, the optimal rate of devaluation turns out to be
e0(peg, dev) = Tr$(peg, dev) =  + «)■ (51)
The weak policy maker’s conditional expected utility after a devaluation 
thus is
E(Vo(peg,dev)\io) =
1 + c (&> + «)2 + Py + c**+ ^ c(1 + c)k2
^ ( i  +  c) ( i + (52)
The strategies S(peg,pool,W) constitute a sequential equilibrium 
if and only if there exists a prior belief p0 such that, for all possible 
realizations of £0, the expected utility with a devaluation in the first 
period is not larger than without one,
E{V0(peg,dev)\i^) < E {V0(peg, p o o l ) ^ . (53)
Substituting (49) and (52) into this inequality, we get:
Lemma 6 Under a policy regime of exchange rate pegging, a pooling 
equilibrium exists in the finitely repeated signalling game if and only if
(1 +  c) k
( s{ +  k )2 <  (3(1 +  c) k 1 -
(1 +  p0c)2
(54)
If (54) holds, the weak policy maker pegs the exchange rate in the first 
period even though he has full discretion. The intuition behind this result 
is as follows: Provided that 7rjj(peg,pool) =  0, the weak policy maker’s 
expected gain from mimicking the strong one in the first period comes 
from maintaining the pre-game reputation for being strong until the last 
period of the game. However, as in the previous example, this has a cost 




























































































contrast, if he devalues and collects the gains from the resulting surprise 
inflation, he can offset this shock, but his type is revealed in the first 
period already. The costs of a devaluation are therefore to be seen in the 
fact that the suboptimal discretionary Nash-equilibrium of the one shot 
game (with the unwanted inflationary bias) materializes in the second 
period. Hence, provided that the support of the productivity shock is not 
too large and the discount factor is not too small, W finds it optimal to 
postpone the devaluation to the second period if the resulting stimulation 
of second period output is large enough, i.e. if po is sufficiently high.
5.2 P o o lin g  under In fla tion  T argetin g
Now the question is addressed under which conditions a pooling equilib­
rium exists with inflation targeting. Given that the strong policy maker 
is precommited to the ex ante optimal policy rule (18), consider first the 
expected payoff of the weak policy maker in a pooling equilibrium. Since 
he imitates the strong type in the first period of the game, one has
7Tq (//oaf, pool) and Trl(float,pool) =  0. (55)
Hence there is no updating of beliefs after the first period and inflation 
expectations for the second period are
7refloat, pool) — (1 — p,o)TTi(float,pool). (56)
After substitution of (55) and (56) into E(v\ (float,pool) |/i), one finds 
for the ex post optimal second period policy rule
7iAfloat,pool) =  — — 6  +  -  
1 +  c 1 + Ho c
(57)
The conditional expectation of the weak policy maker’s utility in a pool­
ing equilibrium can then be shown to equal:
E(V0(float,pool)\ï0) = - |{ ï ^ [ f o + 2 Ç 0 n+0a{\ + 1 + P(l+c)





























































































~ \ 0- + c) ( !  + 0 )^1- (58)
The derivation of the policy maker’s expected utility after a devia­
tion from the ex ante optimal policy rule is quite tedious. In part F of 
the appendix, it is proved that
E(Vo(float, dev) |/0) =  E(v0(float, dev)|/0) (59)
+ f3 E (vi( float, dev)\ï0l revelation)ZSj) '
Using (58) and (59), appendix G derives the following equilibrium con­
dition:
Lemma 7 Under a policy regime of inflation targeting, a pooling equi­
librium exists in the finitely repeated signalling game if and only if
Hence, if control over the inflation rate is relatively precise and the pre­
game reputation for being strong is sufficiently high, then a pooling equi­
librium exists despite the incompleteness of information about the policy 
maker’s actions under inflation targeting. On the other hand, if control 
over inflation is very imprecise, then the expected gain from imitation 
may be reduced so considerably that a pooling equilibrium does not exist 
under inflation targeting. This is due to the fact that a large amount of 
noise makes the detection of excess surprise inflation fairly unlikely.
If a pooling equilibrium does not exist, then the sequential equilib­





























































































Under the condition that the support of the control error is sufficiently 
large, i.e. ck < s^, part H of the appendix shows:
Lemma 8 Given condition (60) is violated under a policy regime of 
inflation targeting, the equilibrium policy rule in the finitely repeated 
signalling game is
where
nQ^float.bias) — ------£o +1 + c
1UJ = 1 — 1 - (1 + p0c)2
  WCK, (61)
(1 -I- c)/3k 
4s,/,
(62)
First, notice that w € [0,1] if (60) does not hold. Secondly, one may 
observe that the inflationary bias is the larger, the more imprecisely 
inflation can be controlled, i.e. the larger is the support of ip. This comes 
about because for a larger amount of noise, the probability of incurring 
the adverse consequences of revelation in the first period is lower. In the 
limit ŝ , is infinite and the discretionary inflation rate is the sequential 
equilibrium strategy of the weak policy maker in the first period of the 
game. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the sequential equilibrium 
may no longer be a standard pooling or separating equilibrium when 
signals are noisy. Instead, there are positive probabilities (ujck)/(2s ,̂) 
and 1 — (ujck)/(2s ,̂) with which the weak policy maker’s type is revealed 
or not revealed, respectively.
5.3 Im p orts o f  C red ib ility  T h rou gh  E xch an ge R a te  
P eg g in g
In this final subsection, we are interested in characterizing a condition 
under which exchange rate pegging imports credibility. Comparing ex­
pressions (54) and (60) leads to
Proposition 3 In the finitely repeated signalling game, the following 




























































































librium when the exchange rate is pegged but not when the inflation rate 
is targeted:
(1 + c)k (s^ +  n)2q < /3( 1 +  c)k
1 - (1 +  p0c)2. < 4s„ (63)
There certainly exist parameter constellations for which both of these 
inequalities are satisfied. For example, if the support ŝ  of the domestic 
productivity shock is small, the relative weight on output stimulation c 
large, and the pre-game reputation /i0 large too, then the first inequal­
ity is satisfied. For a large support of the control error the second 
inequality can also be ensured. As in the infinitely repeated game, it is 
therefore possible that exchange rate pegging is a sequential equilibrium 
strategy while targeting the ex ante optimal policy rule under a floating 
exchange rate is not.
Using the previous results, we can now study what happens to the 
credibility of the weak policy maker in this case, i.e. if (63) holds. As 
in Drazen and Masson (1994), credibility is defined as the (expected) 
posterior, that is, as the (expectation of the) probability after the first 
period of the policy game that the policy maker is strong. Under a pegged 
exchange rate regime, this probability equals the pre-game probability 
Pi =  go, witnessing the fact that the equilibrium is pooling. In contrast, 
since the equilibrium is no longer pooling under a float, the reputation of 
the weak policy maker after the first period depends on the inflationary 
bias lock and the realization of the inflation rate. More precisely, the 
expected probability for being strong is
E(pi\Io) =
Since this expression clearly is smaller than p0 if 0 < u, we finally have:
Proposition 4 Given condition (63) is satisfied in the finitely repeated 
signalling game, the transparency advantage of a pegged exchange rate 
leads to an import of credibility from the credible foreign policy maker




























































































and eliminates an average inflationary bias that arises under inflation 
targeting.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, the credibility of monetary policy has been analyzed under 
two different nominal exchange rate regimes. When the exchange rate 
floats, the domestic policy maker targets the inflation rate. Since inflation 
is in part uncontrollable due to stochastic disturbances, there prevails 
incomplete information about the policy maker’s actions in this case. In 
contrast, the public knows about the actions of the policy maker when 
he pegs the nominal exchange rate to a low inflation currency governed 
by a precommited foreign policy maker. This comes about because the 
nominal exchange rate can perfectly be controlled if it is consistent with 
economic fundamentals and if there is sufficient access to international 
reserves. Hence pegging the exchange rate is the more transparent policy 
regime.
The incomplete information problem prevailing under a floating ex­
change rate increases the expected gains from a deviation from the ex 
ante optimal low inflation policy as perceived by the policy maker. In 
two repeated policy games, parameter constellations have been identified 
under which an (average) inflationary bias arises when the inflation rate 
is targeted. The transparency difference between a pegged exchange rate 
and a targeted inflation rate under a float thus explains why pegging the 
exchange rate may import credibility from a precommited foreign pol­
icy maker. The costs of this import of credibility are to be seen in the 
lost flexibility of monetary policy, which cannot be used to accommodate 
asymmetric productivity shocks when the exchange rate is pegged. Im­
ports of credibility are therefore only possible if the real shocks impinging 
on both economies are not too different.
It should be stressed that these results have not been derived from 
the credibility of any sort of mutual exchange rate agreement designed 




























































































inflation surprises under a floating exchange rate. Instead the analysis 
has deliberately been restricted to a unilateral peg. Moreover, constitu­
tional arrangements that require the exchange rate to be pegged have not 
been assumed. An example of such an arrangement is the constitutional 
amendment by which Sweden precommited to the gold standard.
In conclusion, some limitations of this paper are discussed, which 
may indicate possibilities for further research. To begin with, it has been 
assumed that the domestic policy maker can either partially precommit 
or that there is a positive pre-game probability that he can fully precom­
mit. If with certainty there is complete discretion, then credibility cannot 
be imported through exchange rate pegging in the present set-up. More­
over, only two different policy regimes have been analyzed. One might 
be tempted to argue that this is misleading since interest rate pegging 
has not been considered despite the fact that it might be as transparent 
as exchange rate pegging. However, if the real interest rates are equal 
in the two countries, if capital is perfectly mobile, and if domestic and 
foreign bonds axe perfect substitutes, a zero planned inflation rate in the 
domestic country implies the equality of the two nominal interest rates. 
The no-arbitrage condition then requires that the expected rate of ex­
change devaluation be zero, that is, that the nominal exchange rate be 
pegged. Excluding interest rate pegging from the analysis thus does not 
appear to invalidate the case for exchange rate pegging.
Furthermore, the analysis was restricted to situations in which a 
pegged exchange rate is in principle consistent with the economic funda­
mentals. The possibility of speculative attacks has therefore been ruled 
out. Consequently, the results derived here do not apply to situations 
in which the policy maker pegs the exchange rate and at the same time 
expands the domestic money supply so as to achieve a higher domes­
tic than foreign inflation rate.24 And finally, we have abstracted from 
optimal taxation considerations. In particular, situations in which the 
domestic authority optimally collects a significant share of government 
revenues from the inflation tax, resulting from a significantly positive





























































































inflation rate, have not been dealt with. In a related paper, Herrendorf 
(1994) showed that pegging the exchange rate may in such situations 
no longer be credible, even though it would be if the optimal inflation 
rates from a public finance point of view were similar between the two 
countries.
A ppendix
A . D er iv a tio n  o f E x p ression  (18)
For a policy rule from the set 1Z, inflation expectations are 7r(e =  6. 
Substituting this into (14) gives:25
E (vt{opt)\lt- i)  =  - i | [ c ( a - l ) 2 +  a2](j| +  CK2 +  62 + (l+c)(T^|. (A.l)
(A.l) implies that it is optimal to set 6 =  0. Moreover, taking the first 
order condition with respect to a shows that
Hence the optimal policy rule under precommitment is (18).
B . D er iv a tio n  o f  E x p ression  (27)
In order to derive the equilibrium rule under discretion, one starts out 
with a rule from the set 1Z. Analogously to the derivation under precom­
mitment, it can be shown that
a —
c
1 +  c
(B.l)
25Note that it is appropriate to consider the expectation conditional on It - 1  since 




























































































Hence the rule under discretion is of the form
■tfidis) = Y ^rc^t + b-
The substitution of (B.2) into (14) yields 
E (yt{dis) |/n) = ~ \ \ c l
(B.2)
11 +  c
1 + c
2
+ b — 7Tf(dis) — K +
+ (1 +  c)a;
i
(B.3)
Taking the first order condition with respect to b while treating 7r*(dis) 
as given leads to the policy maker’s reaction function under discretion,
b =
1 + c 7Tl(dis) + K .
(B.4)
Since 7Tf(dis) = b under the policy rule (B.2), (B.4) implies that in equi­
librium
b — ck, (B.5)
which proves (27).
C. P r o o f o f  L em m a 3
If we use (32) and (34), we find that (35) is equivalent to
0 < (1 +  c)2 e2 +
K
. 2s^
£ Vf > 0. (C.l)
Dividing (C.l) by e and letting e converge to zero yields the necessary 
condition
2c/tsy, < K. (C.2)
Since the coefficient of e in (C.l) is positive when (C.2) holds, (C.2) is 




























































































D. Proof of Lemma 4
In order to derive (37), assume that the policy rule is of the form
■Krt (bias) =  +pc«, p € (0,1]. (D.l)
Given this is an equilibrium policy rule, individual inflation expectations 
are 7r‘(bias) = pen. The expected utility from following (D.l) therefore 
is
E(Vt(bias)\it) = -
2 ( 1  +  c) 
1
2(1 - / ? ) l
Now, consider a deviation from (D.l) of the form
C  + 2(1 +  cp)£tn + j
(1  +  cp2)c/c2 +  ( 1  +  c)<72
7T’l(dev) - 1 + cG + PCK +  £> P € (0,1], £ 7̂  0.
(D.2)
(D.3)
The expected utility of the policy maker from this deviation can be shown 
to equal
E(Vt{dev)\it) = E{Vt(bias)\it) -  | ^ ± ^ £ 2 + P(e)K -  (1 -  p)cK£
(DA)
where P(e) =  e/2s^,. Hence, (D.l) is a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium, 
if and only if
1 T c o
0 < ——- £2 + V £^0. (D.5)
Since the right hand side is a quadratic function in £ that becomes zero 
for £ = 0, (D.5) can only hold if that quadratic function has a minimum 
in zero. Taking the first order condition with respect to e, this is found 
to be true if and only if





























































































E . P r o o f o f  P ro p o s itio n  2
On the one hand, the expected present value of utility under exchange 
rate pegging can be shown to equal
E{Vt{peg)\lt^ )  = -  ^  [ca\ + ck2 + (1 +  c)<rj.], (E.l)
On the other hand, one finds for a float with a policy rule (37) 
E(Vt(bias)\lt^ )  = 2(1 — f3)Yl + c
- cr| + ( 1 + cp2 ) c/t2 + ( 1+ c) C7̂ , (E.2)
where p is given by (38). (E.l) and (E.2) imply that (44) is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for ensuring
(E.3)
F . D eriv a tio n  o f  E x p ression  (59)
A deviation from pooling may take the following form,
Ko(float,dev) = £ > 0. (E-l)
The conditional expectation of policy maker’s utility in the first period 
after this deviation turns out to be
E {y0(float,dev)\i0) = jjTjT̂o + 2̂ok] + ck2 + (1 + c)a\ j
- ^ [ ( 1  +  c ) e 2  -  2 c k c ] .  ( F . 2 )
Moreover, after a deviation, individual inflation expectations for the sec­




























































































period. Two possible cases are to be distinguished. In the first case,
7TKfloat, dev) +  xp0 < 7r%( float,pool) + s^, (F.3)
or equivalently
i>o < -  e. (F.4)
If such a realization of the shock occurs, then the deviation cannot be 
detected, because the resulting inflation rate could also occur if the policy 
maker followed the ex ante optimal rule. By Bayes rule, there is no 
updating of beliefs in this case and the posterior equals the prior,
H i  = pT-o6(5|7T0) = H o ■
For a deviation e £ (0,2s,/,), this outcome occurs with probability 1 -
e/(2s^,). In this case, we get
C C
ir1! (float, dev) = ----- £i +  ---------k and
’ 1 + c 1 l+Hoc
c
nU float, dev) — ---------k,
1V ’ l+Hoc
(F.5)
which implies for the expected second period utility of the policy maker:
e (vi(float,dev) |/0,no revelation) — — ^
1 +  c° t +
c(l +  c) 2
(1 + H o c ) 2
+ (1 4- c)(T2 (F.6)
In the opposite case, one has
7Tq (float, dev) +ip0 > {float,pool) + s$, (F.7)
which is equivalent to
ipo > S# -  £. (F.8)
The realized inflation rate then is such that it could not result if (18) 




























































































im p ly ing  a  zero p ro b a b ility  of b e in g  strong
Pi =  prob(S\Tr0) = 0. (F.9)
For a given e > 0, the probability of revelation is e/2 s^. In this case,
7rKflaot, dev)
1 +  c
Çi + ck and (float, dev) = ck, (F.10)
and the expected utility of the policy maker amounts to
E(vi(float,dev)\l0, revelation) =  —— ----—<7? + c(l +  c)
' 1 '  2 LI + c ?
+(1 +  c)°% ■ (F.ll)
Since inflation expectations for the first period are zero in a pooling 
equilibrium, expression (59) for the conditionally expected utility after a 
deviation follows directly from the previous results.
G. P r o o f o f  L em m a 7
The necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pooling equi­
librium under a float is implied by (59),
0 < (1 +  c)e2 +
(1 + / i0c)2
c(l + c)/3k2 
2s J, —  2 c k  > £ Ve > 0.
(G.l)
Dividing this inequality by e and letting e go to zero, one finds a necessary 
condition for (G.l) to be satisfied,
4sy, < (1 + c) /3k 1(1 +  /i0c)2. ‘ (G.2)
Since this condition implies that the coefficient of e in (G.l) is positive, 




























































































H. Proof of Lemma 8
Consider a policy rule of the form
T T ^ f l o a t ^ b i a s )  = — - — £0 +  l o c k , lo €  (0,1]. (H.l)1 + c
If this rule is a sequential equilibrium strategy for the first period of 
game, then
7 r loat,bias) = l o c k . (H.2)
We restrict the analysis to situations in which c/c < s^. Revelation then 
occurs with probability (lock)/(2s ,̂). Using this, (F.6), and (F.ll), one 
may write the expected utility from following rule (H.l) as:
E (v0( float,bias) |/0) =  E(vo(float, 6ms)|/0)












+  c k 2 +
1 +  c
( 1  +  loc)  +  ( UJCk Y
, l + c
LOCK'
2s^.
a2 + c(l + c) k ‘
1 + cOc +
c(l +  c)
(1 +  H o c ) 2
_ 2 ^  +  +  P)°*- (H.3)
In order to derive a condition under which (H.l) is a sequential equilib­
rium strategy of the weak policy maker for the first period of the game, 
consider a deviation of the form
TTQ(float,dev) =
1 +  c
£o + LOCK + £, £ ±  0. (H.4)
Such a deviation results in an expected utility of































































































(1 + c)e2 — 2(1 — Uj)cK£
1 1 c(l +  c) k 2.
(1 + fi0c)2.
Hence, (H.l) is a sequential equilibrium strategy if and only if
„ 1 + c 2
0 <  ——  £2 + 1 - (1 + / i0c)2
c(l +  c)(3n2
4s,/ (1 -  u )ck ) e Ve ±  0 .
(H.6)
Since the right hand side is quadratic function in e that becomes zero for 
£ =  0, (H.6) can only hold if the right hand side has a minimum in zero. 




( l+ / i0c)2J 4s
(1 + c) /3k
~ (1 -w ), (H.7)
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